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UNIVERSITY INVENTIONS RECONSIDERED:
DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF
UNIVERSITY OWNERSHIP
PATRICIA E. CAMPBELL∗
ABSTRACT
Most universities today assert ownership rights over all
patentable inventions (and many other types of intellectual property) created by members of the university community, including
faculty, staff, students, visitors, and others. Universities then attempt to license that intellectual property (IP) to third parties, in
order to generate revenue for the university and to give the public
the benefit of innovations developed by the institution, often with
the use of federal funds. This Article provides an evaluation of the
technology transfer policies and practices of U.S. universities. Part I
surveys the IP policies of a representative group of universities, showing that most universities claim outright ownership of the invention rights of most members of the university community, while a few
require present or future assignment of such rights to the university.
Part II reviews the history of IP ownership and demonstrates that
claims to ownership of university inventions evolved slowly over
the course of the last 100 years, beginning with inventor ownership
as the accepted model and culminating in the passage of the BayhDole Act in 1980 and subsequent case law. Parts III and IV provide
two proposals for addressing problems in the current ownership
and technology transfer model. One is a more “modest” proposal
that could be implemented immediately by universities to bring their
IP policies and agreements into line with relevant laws; the other is
a long-term proposal for discussion and substantial change in
which university inventors would have an option to retain ownership
of their inventions, and universities could assume more natural
and supportive roles as educators and facilitators.

Patricia Campbell is a Law School Professor at the University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law, where she serves as director of the Intellectual
Property Law Program. She also directs the Maryland Intellectual Property Legal
Resource Center and its Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship Clinic.
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INTRODUCTION
Alexander Graham Bell was a professor at Boston University’s School of Oratory from 1874 to 1879.1 In addition to his
teaching responsibilities, Bell was conducting research on a “harmonic telegraph,” which transmitted multiple messages over a
single wire at one time using different tones.2 In 1875, relying on a
one-year advance on his teaching salary, he began working on an
expanded version of his invention which would transmit the human
voice.3 Bell invented the telephone, and on March 7, 1876, he received his first patent, U.S. Patent No. 174,465.4 Bell’s telephone
patents have sometimes been characterized as “the most valuable
patents ever issued.”5 Bell owned the patents himself and was
not required to share ownership, control, or profits with Boston
University.6 The Bell Telephone Company was founded in 1877,
and in 1899, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) became
the parent company of Bell Telephone.7 Bell ultimately brought
(and won) numerous lawsuits against defendants who allegedly
infringed on his telephone patents.8
In today’s world, a very different outcome might result.9
The university would likely have claimed ownership of the invention, and Bell would have been required to assign any resulting
patents to the university.10 The university’s technology transfer
office would then have attempted to find a licensee to commercialize

Brian Fitzgerald, Alexander Graham Bell: The BU Years, 5 B.U. BRIDGE
(Sept. 2001), https://www.bu.edu/bridge/archive/2001/09-14/bell.html [https://
perma.cc/Y36T-MZL7].
2 Id.
3 ROBERT BRUCE, ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE CONQUEST OF SOLITUDE
143 (Little, Brown and Company, 1973).
4 Id. at 174.
5 Id. at 176.
6 See Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1 (Oct. 6, 2010), https://stm.sciencemag.org/content/sci
transmed/2/52/52cm27.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8V9-JSTY].
7 See BRUCE, supra note 3, at 231, 293; AT&T’s History of Invention and
Breakups, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2016/02/12/technology/att-history.html [https://perma.cc/HZ4W-DK7D].
8 See, e.g., Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 1 (1888).
9 See generally Loise & Stevens, supra note 6.
10 Id.
1
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the invention.11 In order to maximize revenues, the technology
transfer office might have attempted to license Bell’s patent to his
competitor, Elisha Gray.12 Alternatively, it might have encouraged
Bell to create a startup company that would license his own inventions back from the school, and Bell might have located that
startup in a business incubator sponsored by the university.13 Bell
would receive a share of the royalties his company paid to the
university after patenting costs were reimbursed, while any remainder would have been used to support other research and
development efforts at the school.14 As the owner of the patents,
the university would probably have been required to participate
in the infringement suits Bell brought against his competitors,
which the university might have been reluctant to do.15
This Article provides an evaluation of the technology
transfer policies and practices of U.S. universities today. Part I
surveys the intellectual property (IP) policies of a representative
group of universities, showing that most universities claim outright ownership of the invention rights of most members of the
university community, while a few require present or future assignment of such rights to the university. Part II reviews the history
of IP ownership and demonstrates that claims to ownership of university inventions evolved slowly over the course of the last 100
years, beginning with inventor ownership as the accepted model
and culminating in the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980
and subsequent case law. Parts III and IV provide two proposals
for addressing problems in the current ownership and technology
transfer model. One is a more “modest” proposal that could be
implemented immediately by universities to bring their IP policies and agreements into line with relevant laws; the other is a

Id. at 2.
See JOHN E. NATHAN, FISH & NEAVE, LEADERS IN THE LAW OF IDEAS 16–17
(Newcomen Society of the United States 1997) (The Western Union Telegraph
Company was offered the opportunity to acquire the 465 patent in 1876 for
$100,000. Western Union declined, declaring the telephone to be an “ungainly
and impractical device” and calling Bell’s idea of installing a telephone in every
house and business “idiotic on the face of it.”).
13 Loise & Stevens, supra note 6, at 2–3.
14 Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of
University Inventors in Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 285, 311 (2014).
15 Id. at 289–90.
11
12
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long-term proposal for discussion and substantial change, where
university inventors would have an option to retain ownership of
their inventions, and universities could assume more natural and
supportive roles as educators and facilitators.
I.UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES MAKE
BROAD OWNERSHIP CLAIMS
Most universities today assert ownership rights over all
patentable inventions (and many other types of intellectual property) created by members of the university community.16 The
ownership claims encompass not only inventions made by faculty
and staff members but frequently also extend to graduate and
professional students, undergraduates, visitors, professionals in
residence, and others.17 While some ownership assertions may be
included in employment agreements signed by members of the
faculty and staff, in many instances these claims are simply included in an obscure Intellectual Property Policy or a faculty
handbook that is posted on the university’s website.18 When they
commence employment or register for classes, members of the
university community may not even be aware that the university
has an Intellectual Property Policy and do not understand that
they may not own inventions and research they create while they
are associated with the university.19
Some IP policies simply contain a blanket claim to ownership
of inventions, while others include a present assignment of all inventions created in the future or an obligation to assign future
inventions after they have come into existence.20 A review of the IP
policies of the top thirty U.S. engineering graduate schools21


See, e.g., Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property § 1(C), HARV.
UNIV., https://otd.harvard.edu/faculty-inventors/resources/policies-and-proce
dures/statement-of-policy-in-regard-to-intellectual-property/ [https://perma.cc
/6A7T-NDY5].
17 See, e.g., id. at 2.
18 See, e.g., id.
19 Pat K. Chew, Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 259, 289 (1992).
20 See, e.g., American University Patent Policies: A Brief History, AM. ASS’N
OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/ShortHis
tory.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN4G-NCFR].
21 Top Engineering Colleges—2018, GRADUATESHOTLINE, https://www.gradu
ateshotline.com/ranks/ [https://perma.cc/D5E3-YBPD]. Based on the U.S. News
16
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shows that they vary greatly in the extent to which they claim
ownership or require assignment of inventions, as well as in their
overall tone and complexity.22 Many university IP policies begin
with broad policy statements confirming the university’s dedication to teaching, research, and public service.23 For example, the IP
policy of the Texas A&M University System24 includes the following general policy statement:
The system is committed to teaching, inquiry-driven learning
and the research associated with it, and public service. Research
is one of the most important and rewarding aspects of the educational process, regularly leading to the development of new ideas,
discoveries and technologies with the potential to benefit the
public at large.
This policy is based on three fundamental principles: enhancing
academic freedom, providing a clear pathway for pursuing technology commercialization, and protecting all interested parties.
To that end, the purposes of this policy are to:



and World Report rankings for 2018, the top 30 graduate programs in engineering (in alphabetical order) are California Institute of Technology, Carnegie
Mellon University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Duke University,
Georgia Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, North Carolina State University,
Northwestern University, Ohio State University, Princeton University, Purdue
University–West Lafayette, Rice University, Stanford University, Texas A&M
University–College Station, University of California–Berkeley, University of
California–Los Angeles, University of California–San Diego, University of
California–Santa Barbara, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, University
of Maryland–College Park, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, University of
Minnesota–Twin Cities, University of Pennsylvania, University of Southern
California, University of Texas–Austin, University of Wisconsin–Madison, University of Washington, and Virginia Tech. Id. This group appears to be representative of universities producing substantial amounts of research and potentially
patentable inventions.
22 For similar methodologies, see Love, supra note 14, at 293; Chew, supra
note 19, at 274 (discussing the policies of the universities with the twenty largest
research expenditures in 1987). Chew’s article, published in 1992, suggests that
university IP policies were in a transitional stage, with many schools moving in
the direction of claiming comprehensive rights in faculty discoveries and creations.
Id. at 274–75.
23 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Management and Commercialization, THE
TEX. A&M UNIV. SYS., http://policies.tamus.edu/17-01.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NQ76-SY9B].
24 Id.
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(a) ensure that the commercial development of research
results enhances the system’s education, research and public
service missions;
(b) protect the academic freedom of faculty with respect to
publication of their research findings;
(c) foster an entrepreneurial environment through incentives
and protections that encourages the creation, discovery, development and rapid transfer of new knowledge for the public benefit;
(d) educate and assist faculty, staff and others in the use
of the intellectual property process with respect to their discoveries and inventions; and
(e) establish the principles for determining and protecting
the interests of the system, creator and sponsor with respect
to discoveries and inventions created by faculty, staff and others
in a manner that is equitable to all parties.25

The policy may also recognize that the university plays an
important role in local or national economic development.26 Other
schools explicitly acknowledge that one purpose of their IP policy
is to generate financial resources to support further research.27


25 Id. at 1–2; see also Intellectual Property Policy, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.
2, https://www.cmu.edu/policies/administrative-and-governance/intellectual-prop
erty.html [https://perma.cc/S9ZG-AB44] (“The mission of the university remains
the generation and dissemination of knowledge.”); Intellectual Property Policy,
Georgia Inst. of Tech. 1, http://www.policylibrary.gatech.edu/print/book/export
/html/1728 [https://perma.cc/73D6-NMF2] (“The Georgia Institute of Technology
(GIT) is dedicated to teaching, research, and the extension of knowledge to the
public. Its personnel recognize as two of their major objectives, the production
of new knowledge and the dissemination of both old and new knowledge.”); Rice
University Policy No. 333: Patent and Software Policies, Rice Univ. 1, https://
policy.rice.edu/sites/g/files/bxs1746/f/333.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KAW-G747] (“Rice
University is dedicated to teaching, research, and the dissemination of all new
knowledge generated within the University community.”); University of Maryland
Intellectual Property Policy, UNIV. OF MD., C. PARK, 1, https://president.umd.edu
/administration/policies/section-iv-research/iv-320a [https://perma.cc/AYF6-CHCG]
(“The primary mission of universities is to advance, preserve, and disseminate knowledge.”).
26 See, e.g., Faculty Handbook Appendix P: Policies Related to Research (Policies on Inventions, Patents, and Technology Transfer), DUKE UNIV. 7, https://
provost.duke.edu/sites/all/files/FHB_App_P.pdf [https://perma.cc/G32F-CAPK].
27 See, e.g., Patent Policy, UNIV. OF CAL. 2, https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2500493
/PatentPolicy [https://perma.cc/GCV5-DXQ4] (stating that the policy was adopted,
in part, “to provide for the use of invention-related income for the further support of research and education”); University of Maryland Intellectual Property
Policy, supra note 25, at 1 (stating that the policy was established, in part, to
“generate resources to support the University’s primary mission.”).
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The great majority of IP policies reviewed for this Article
affirmatively state that the university “owns” all intellectual property created by members of the university community, at least to
the extent that the IP was created in the course of employment
or with the use of university resources.28 Many of these policies then

See, e.g., Inventions and Related Property Rights, CORNELL UNIV. 8, https://
www.dfa.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/policy/vol1_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KTF
-REP4] (inventions “belong to the university”); see also Faculty Handbook Appendix P: Policies Related to Research (Policies on Inventions, Patents, and Technology Transfer), supra note 26 (inventions made on university time or with
university resources “shall be considered the property of the university”); Guide to
the Ownership, Distribution and Commercial Development of MIT Technology,
MASS. INST. OF TECH. 6, https://tlo.mit.edu/sites/default/files/MIT-TLO-ownership
-guide_0.pdf) [https://perma.cc/NQD5-HGAJ] (“Patents, copyrights on software,
maskworks, and tangible research property and trademarks developed by faculty,
students, staff and others, ... are owned by MIT when either of the following applies.”); Intellectual Property, PURDUE UNIV., https://www.purdue.edu/policies
/academic-research-affairs/ia1.html [https://perma.cc/PLX8-68MG] (“Intellectual Property that arises in any part in the course of employment or enrollment
at the University, or in the course of a work-for-hire relationship or visiting scholar
relationship with the University, is Purdue Intellectual Property,” except in
certain stated situations.); Intellectual Property Management and Commercialization, supra note 23, at 2; Intellectual Property Policy, THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIV. 3, https://www.jhu.edu/assets/uploads/2014/09/intellectual_property_policy
.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7KU-89GC] (“The University owns all rights, title and
interest in and to Intellectual Property developed as a result of support either
directly from or channeled through the University.”); Patent and Tangible Research Property Policies and Procedures of the University of Pennsylvania,
UNIV. OF PA. 1, http://pci.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Patent-Policy
-Most-Recent.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D9L-BSN5] (all inventions conceived or
reduced to practice by inventors in the scope of employment or with substantial
use of university resources are the property of the university); Patent Policy,
PRINCETON UNIV., https://dof.princeton.edu/policies-procedure/policies/patents
[https:// perma.cc/5CZ4-PPG5] (“The University shall own all rights in any discovery or invention resulting from research carried on by any Faculty member, employee, or student”); Policies and Practices on Intellectual Property: A
Summary, UNIV. OF ILL. 1, https://otm.illinois.edu/sites/all/files/files/ippolicypa
performatted.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ4K-6LNQ] (“The University is the owner
of all software, copyrightable works and inventions.”); Policy on Intellectual
Property, VA. POLYTECHNIC INST. AND STATE UNIV. 3, http://www.policies.vt
.edu/13000.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYW8-7954] (“ownership of the IP rests with
the University”); Technology Transfer Policy, UNIV. OF MICH. 3, https://tech
transfer.umich.edu/for-inventors/policies/technology-transfer-policy/ [https://per
ma.cc/63EP-A4JE] (Michigan’s policy also contains a trailer clause, claiming
that the university owns IP made by a former employee if it was made with
28
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include an irrevocable assignment by the inventor to the university
of all right, title, and interest in inventions that he or she may
create.29 For example, the Intellectual Property Policy of the
University of Texas System states that “the Board of Regents automatically owns the intellectual property created by individuals
subject to this Rule.”30 Similarly, Rice University’s policy states,
“[r]ights to inventions developed by members of the University
shall vest in the University when there was support of the inventor(s) efforts through use of University funds, facilities, personnel or other resources.”31 However, Columbia University’s policy
is something of an anomaly. Its introductory comments stress the
need for balance between faculty privilege and university rights and
needs with respect to inventions and associated technology, and it
further states that “faculty members must take the ultimate moral
responsibility for the development and commercial exploitation of
the fruits of their intellectual activities.”32 Ultimately, however,
Columbia lays claim, “as it may fairly and rightly do,” to the
commercial rights in inventions resulting from use of its facilities or
from activities of faculty members engaged in university service.33

substantial faculty guidance or university resources, and during activity directly relating to and closely following employment); University of Maryland
Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 25, at 6 (“The University owns all
rights, title and interests, including Intellectual Property rights, in Inventions,
Software, Research Data and Tangible Research Materials that are created,
conceived or reduced to practice by Personnel or Students.”); University Patent
and Invention Policy, NW. UNIV. 3, https://www.invo.northwestern.edu/inven
tion-disclosure/policies-forms/University_Patent_and_Invention_Policy_090117
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP2K-B3PW] (“All Inventions or Discoveries to which
this policy applies are owned by Northwestern University.”).
29 See, e.g., Rule 90101: Intellectual Property, UNIV. OF TX. SYS. 2, https://
www.utsystem.edu/board-of-regents/rules/90101-intellectual-property [https://
perma.cc/822H-2DVF] (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 Rice University Policy No. 333: Patent and Software Policies, supra note 25,
at 2 (emphasis added).
32 Statement of Policy on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products of
Faculty Activity, COLUM. UNIV. 1, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa/handbook
/appendixd.html [https://perma.cc/4UZ9-NTRJ].
33 Id. Columbia’s policy further recognizes that university-related activities may also give rise to commercially profitable architectural and theatrical
designs and technical writings, but it admits that it has not yet determined
the proper claims of the university with respect to those properties. Id.

86 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:077
Other universities do not make an outright claim of ownership; instead, they require that all patentable inventions must be
assigned to the university in the future.34 Stanford University’s
current IP policy provides that “[t]itle to [potentially patentable]
inventions shall be assigned to the University, regardless of the
source of funding, if any.”35 At the University of Washington, an
Executive Order states, “as a condition of employment, and even
if a specific patent agreement is not signed, University employees
agree to assign all inventions in which the University has an interest to the University.”36 Only a few universities have language in
their IP policies requiring that, as a condition of employment, faculty and staff members must execute a separate patent agreement assigning all rights in intellectual property to the university.37
Occasionally, sponsorship agreements are given deference
to determine ownership of intellectual property created under
the agreement.38 Carnegie Mellon’s policy provides that “intellectual property created as a result of work conducted under an
agreement between an external sponsor and the university that
specifies the ownership of such intellectual property shall be owned
as specified in said agreement.”39 The University of Wisconsin


Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, STAN. UNIV. § 9.1, https://doresearch
.stanford.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/intellectual-property/inventions
-patents-and-licensing [https://perma.cc/AEJ6-S9BY].
35 Id.
36 Executive Order No. 36: Patent, Invention, and Copyright Policy § 1.C,
UNIV. OF WASH., http://www.washington.edu/admin/rules/policies/PO/EO36
.html [https://perma.cc/335R-PBYM]; see also Patent Policy, CAL. INST. OF
TECH. 1, http://www.ogc.caltech.edu/forms/patentpolicy [https://perma.cc/WRJ8
-J4N7] (“Inventions made by employees in the line of Institute duty or with
the use of Institute facilities may be patented in order to protect and benefit
the Institute and the public. Title to such patents is to be assigned to the Institute or, if appropriate, the sponsor.”); Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual
Property § 1(C), supra note 16 (“Harvard shall have the right to own and each
Inventor, at Harvard’s request, shall assign to Harvard all of his/her right,
title and interest in a Supported Invention.”).
37 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 25; Ownership and Management of Intellectual Property, PA. ST. UNIV., https://policy.psu.edu/policies
/ip01 [https://perma.cc/H2LS-K44J] (“As a condition of employment, the Intellectual Property Agreement ... is required to be completed and signed.”); Patent
Policy, supra note 27 (“An agreement to assign inventions and patents to the
University, ... shall be mandatory.”).
38 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 25.
39 Id. at 6 (The policy further provides that it is the responsibility of the
Office of Sponsored Research of the university to inform each person whose IP
34
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policy characterizes inventor ownership as a default and states,
“[e]xcept as required by funding agreements or other University
policies, the University does not claim ownership rights in the
intellectual property generated during research by its faculty, staff,
or students.”40 The policy subsequently states that if there are no
specific written agreements to the contrary, the inventor is free
to dispose of the rights in the manner of his/her own choosing.41
Not surprisingly, virtually all of the policies reviewed impose
a strict duty of disclosure on members of the university community.42 Princeton’s Patent Policy clearly states that “discoveries
and inventions must be disclosed to the Office of Technology Licensing as soon as practicable.”43 A few universities explicitly
link the disclosure requirement to their obligations under funding
agreements.44 For example, Texas A&M explains to inventors that
“[p]rompt disclosure is especially important for inventions conceived
and/or made with federal or state agency funding so that the system ... may meet its legal obligations under such funding agreements.”45 Other IP policies are somewhat more permissive and
merely encourage inventors to disclose IP in a timely manner.46


rights are limited by an externally sponsored agreement of the IP provisions in
that agreement in advance of beginning work thereon.). But see University Patent
and Invention Policy, supra note 28, at 3 (providing that “[w]here the University
has entered into an agreement for a project sponsored by a government agency
or private firm, the terms of that agreement will govern the disposition of patents
and licenses.”).
40 Intellectual Property Policies and Procedures for University Research,
UNIV. OF WIS.–MADISON GRAD. SCH. 4, https://kb.wisc.edu/images/group156
/32996/12.15IntellectualPropertyPoliciesandProceduresforUniversityResearch
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RJ6-RBRD] (observing that this policy “has proven beneficial to the University, the public, and the creators of such property.”).
41 Id. However, in the case of inventions funded by a federal agency or under
a sponsored research agreement that require the university to grant rights to
the funder, the inventor is required to assign rights to the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation, the university’s patent management organization. Id.
42 See, e.g., Patent Policy, supra note 28, at 2.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Evaluation and Protection of Intellectual Property, TEX. A&M
UNIV. SYS. 1, http://policies.tamus.edu/17-01-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BEL-7TEZ].
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 25 (“To assure protection
and potential Commercialization, Georgia Tech faculty, staff, and students are
encouraged to disclose Intellectual Property to GTRC in a timely manner prior to
any disclosure outside of Georgia Institute of Technology.”); see also Policy on
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Northwestern University attempts to ensure prompt disclosure of
inventions to the university by explaining the detrimental effects
that public disclosures may have on patent rights:
United States patent law permits the filing of a patent application within one year of publication; however, under foreign
patent law, any public disclosure disqualifies the Invention or
Discovery from patent protection. Therefore, to protect academic
priority as well as commercial priority, any Inventor making any
Invention or Discovery subject to this policy is encouraged to
report it promptly in writing and in reasonable detail ... preferably
within 30 days of making the Invention or Discovery. Public
disclosure of the research results may affect patent rights.47

These expansive claims of ownership and attendant duties
are uniformly imposed on faculty, staff, and other university employees (including students who are also employed by the university in some capacity).48 However, in some instances, the language
in an IP policy sweeps so broadly that it extends even to undergraduates, graduate and professional students, and non-degree
students who are paying tuition and related fees to attend the
university.49 Harvard University’s policy states that it is applicable to all students who use university funds, facilities or other
resources.50 Columbia University’s policy on intellectual property products of faculty activity contains an advisory note indicating that “the Trustees, on the recommendation of the University
Senate, made the Policy Statement applicable to all students of
the University, regardless of whether they hold appointments as
student officers of instruction and research or not.”51


Intellectual Property, supra note 28 (explaining that a “timely” disclosure is one
made before publication or other enabling nonconfidential disclosure).
47 University Patent and Invention Policy, supra note 28, at 3.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property § 1(C), supra
note 16, at 2.
50 Id. On its face, the language of Harvard’s policy is so broad that it could
arguably include students who receive financial aid, although it is unclear
whether it is actually administered in that fashion. See also Patent Policy,
supra note 28 (“All Faculty members, employees, and students, in consideration of their membership in the academic community and upon the approval
of this policy by the Trustees and the Faculty of Princeton University, agree
to handle inventions and patents resulting therefrom as follows.”).
51 Statement of Policy on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products of
Faculty Activity, supra note 32.
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Conversely, other universities have created special policies that exempt student coursework and other activities.52 For
example, the University of Illinois has identified exceptions to its
general policy for student entrepreneurship activities53 and student class projects.54 The University of Maryland’s policy gives
extensive ownership rights to students:
Students shall own all rights, title and interests, including Intellectual Property rights, in Inventions, Software, Research
Data and Tangible Research Materials they create, conceive or
reduce to practice in the performance of their academic and research activities whether or not they use Significant University
Resources provided they are not owned by the University under
Section V.D.1.55

Others simply note that they generally do not claim ownership rights over intellectual property created by students who
are not also employees of the university.56


See, e.g., Student Ownership Policy, UNIV. OF ILL., https://otm.illinois
.edu/disclose-protect/student-ownership-policy [https://perma.cc/BVM5-57VH].
53 Id. at 1–2 (“A variety of campus initiatives support student created start up
activities by providing limited amounts of funding, space and other resources. For
these student initiated and directed start-ups, the University will allow the
students to retain ownership of their intellectual property resulting from
these efforts.”).
54 Id. at 2 (“A similar exception is granted by the Vice President for Research for certain courses (such as industrial arts design or engineering senior design, masters of science in technology management) that allow students
to own their inventions made as part of the course.”).
55 University of Maryland Intellectual Property Policy, supra note 25, at 6;
see also Inventions and Related Property Rights, supra note 28 (providing that
students may own inventions developed during normal classwork, with routine
use of university resources); Rule 90101: Intellectual Property, supra note 29
(Students, including postdoctoral and predoctoral fellows, generally own the IP
they create in courses, during extracurricular activities, and “while using the
resources and facilities of U.T. System institutions commonly provided for a
student’s use and for which a student has paid tuition and fees.”).
56 See Policy on Intellectual Property, supra note 28; see also Student Intellectual Property, PA. STATE UNIV., https://www.research.psu.edu/otm/student
_IP [https://perma.cc/2ZYC-VG6T] (Penn State likewise has a general rule that
student intellectual property that was first conceived or reduced to practice as
work product (e.g., homework assignments, laboratory experiments, and independent studies) for a for-credit course will be owned by the student, and the
university will not claim ownership of such IP. However, the student policy
also includes a number of exceptions for courses and other activities (e.g.,
52
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In a few instances, apparently in recognition of academic
freedom and moral considerations, IP policies allow inventors some
control over the treatment of their inventions.57 Columbia University’s policy recognizes that in some circumstances, the commercialization of an invention may adversely affect public health or
safety, and it acknowledges that the inventor may have a special
interest in preventing such consequences.58 As a result, Columbia
permits inventors to object, on grounds of conscience, the use of
an invention that the inventor believes will adversely affect
health or safety, which the university promises to take such objections into consideration.59 Purdue University’s policy allows Purdue
to contribute software to open source projects with permission from
funding sponsors, if any, and university administrators.60 Stanford
University’s IP policy contains a broader provision and states that:
inventors, acting collectively where there is more than one, are
free to place their inventions in the public domain if they believe that would be in the best interest of technology transfer
and if doing so is not in violation of the terms of any agreements
that supported or related to the work.61

II.HOW DID WE GET HERE?
I have observed that many members of the university
community, as well as outside commentators, assume that universities have always claimed title to inventions created by their
employees and students.62 Others believe that university ownership
of inventions came about due to the passage of the Bayh-Dole

internships and independent studies) where any resulting IP must be assigned to the university or an outside sponsor.); Technology Transfer Policy,
supra note 28 (“The University will not generally claim ownership of Intellectual Property created by students.”).
57 See, e.g., Statement of Policy on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual
Products of Faculty Activity, supra note 32.
58 Id.
59 Statement of Policy on Proprietary Rights in the Intellectual Products of
Faculty Activity (Paragraph G), COLUM. UNIV., http://www.columbia.edu/cu/vpaa
/handbook/appendix.html [https://perma.cc/9R4K-V75Q].
60 Intellectual Property, supra note 28.
61 Research Policy Handbook § 9.1 Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, STAN.
UNIV., https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/30294/print [https://perma.cc
/FWQ4-YQWU].
62 See infra Section II.A.
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Act in 1980.63 However, a review of the history of technology
transfer reveals that neither assumption is accurate.64 University
technology transfer practices evolved gradually over the course
of the last 100 years, often in response to economic conditions that
forced universities to look for alternative sources of funding.65
Well before 1980, universities were routinely claiming ownership of
faculty and staff inventions and engaged in efforts to commercialize them.66 As the following history shows, Bayh-Dole merely
provided a final justification for the model and an opportunity to
expand it even further.67
A.History of University Invention Ownership and Transfer
At the beginning of the twentieth century, no U.S. universities had a written IP policy.68 Universities were engaged in basic
research, not applied research.69 Although very few patentable
inventions were generated in the university setting, the general
practice was that inventors owned any patents that they decided
to pursue arising out of their research activities.70

See Sean M. O’Connor, The Real Issue Behind Stanford v. Roche: Faulty
Conceptions of University Assignment Policies Stemming From the 1947 Biddle
Report, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 379, 412 (2013) (stating that some
universities began assuming that Bayh-Dole obligated a contractor’s employees
to assign inventions by act of law).
64 See generally infra notes 70–194 and accompanying text.
65 See discussion infra Part II.A.
66 Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 333 (2009).
67 See generally infra note 177 and accompanying text.
68 See infra note 77 and accompanying text. The first formal patent policies
were not adopted until 1924.
69 ARCHIE M. PALMER, SURVEY OF UNIVERSITY PATENT POLICIES 5 (1948).
Further, many university scientists were content to publish the results of their
research and dedicate their findings to the public. Id. Compare Peter Lee, Patents
and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–8 (discussing the practical orientation
of U.S. academic institutions and the aversion of universities to patenting).
70 See discussion of the creation of the WARF, infra note 78 and accompanying text. Dr. Harry Steenbock of the University of Wisconsin decided to
patent an invention and offered to assign his patent to the university, but the
university declined. Instead, Steenbock persuaded several alumni to create
the WARF to accept assignment of faculty inventions. See DAVID C. MOWERY
ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
63



92 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:077
In 1912, the Research Corporation was formed by Frederick
Cottrell, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley,
to commercialize his patents on the electrostatic precipitator, a
device that removed dust and fumes from industrial emissions.71
Cottrell believed that patenting was necessary to give the public
the benefit of his inventions since without patent protection, no
manufacturer would be willing to invest in commercializing the
invention.72 Royalties were used to support scientific endeavors
and provide grants for researchers.73 Thereafter, the Research Corporation began managing patentable inventions that other academic inventors donated to the organization.74 Cottrell observed:
The ever growing number of men in academic positions who
evolve useful and patentable inventions from time to time in connection with their regular work and without looking personally
for any financial reward would gladly see these further developed
for the public good, but are disinclined either to undertake such
developments themselves or to place the control in the hands
of any private interests.75

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Research Corporation received
an increased number of requests for patenting and licensing services from faculty inventors, as research collaborations between
universities and industry led to a greater volume of potentially
valuable discoveries and inventions.76
The first formal patent policies were adopted in 1924 by
Lehigh University and Columbia.77 A year later, the Wisconsin

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 39 (Stanford
Univ. Press 2004).
71 Id. at 59. According to Mowery, Cottrell originally considered having the
University of California handle licensing of his patents, but he feared this
would have adverse effects on the scientific research culture at his university.
72 Id. (citing Frederick G. Cottrell, The Research Corporation, an Experiment in Public Administration of Patent Rights, 4 J. INDUS. & ENGINEERING
CHEMISTRY 865 (1912)).
73 Id. at 60.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 62.
77 PALMER, supra note 69, at 18, 19. Despite an initial reluctance, courts
became increasingly willing to enforce employee patent assignments, until by
the early twentieth century it became the rule that employers owned most employee inventions. See Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from
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Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) was created to manage
patenting and licensing of inventions by University of Wisconsin
faculty members.78 Harry Steenbock, a professor in Wisconsin’s
biochemistry department, had discovered that certain milk fats
could be fortified with vitamin D when exposed to ultraviolet
light.79 Steenbock believed that he could have better quality
control over the way his method was used, as well as over future
developments, if he obtained patent protection.80 The Purdue
Research Foundation was subsequently formed in 1930.81
By the 1930s, universities were experiencing the effects of
the Great Depression and were becoming increasingly interested
in financial returns from exploiting faculty inventions. Despite
the financial circumstances, Universities were still often reluctant
to become directly involved in patenting and licensing activities.82
Further, the small number of patentable inventions generated at
most institutions made it impracticable for them to have patent
professionals on staff. As a result, faculty inventors were often
directed to the Research Corporation.83
MIT became the first university to enter into an institutional Invention Administration Agreement with the Research
Corporation.84 When Karl Compton became president of MIT in
1930, the school had no formal patent policy, and inventors often
kept patent rights in their inventions when agreements with
industry sponsors did not require otherwise.85 Compton wanted
to commercialize patents to earn revenue from university research along with creating a formalized structure to govern relations with industry partners.86 Compton therefore commissioned


the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830–1930, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127, 1139 (1998).
78 See History, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND., https://www.warf.org/about
-us/history/history-of-warf.cmsx [https://perma.cc/EH52-XES3].
79 See id.
80 Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2172
(2009).
81 See History, PURDUE RESEARCH FOUND., https://prf.org/about/history.html
[https://perma.cc/VTY3-C6S2].
82 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 63.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 64.
86 HENRY ETZKOWITZ, MIT AND THE RISE OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SCIENCE
59–60 (Routledge 2002).
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an internal study by MIT’s Committee on Patent Policy, which
was charged with finding a way to reconcile commercialization
of university inventions with MIT’s academic mission.87 After
considerable debate, it was decided that MIT would begin asserting ownership rights over any faculty invention financed by
the university. In compensation for ownership, the study recommended that MIT “relieve the Institute of all responsibility in
connection with the exploitation of inventions while providing for a
reasonable return to the Institute in all cases in which profit
shall ensue.”88 As a result, in 1937, MIT entered into a patent
management agreement with the Research Corporation.89
Henry Etzkowitz, author of a study on the MIT model, writes
that MIT “assumed acceptance of an academic patent right,”
although the university hoped to engage in patenting in a way that
would not be offensive to participants or to the public.90 Compton
envisioned MIT as an institution of great academic distinction, but
his ultimate goal was for the university to play a role in economic
development through the creation of new technology companies.91
MIT struggled to reconcile its interest in commercializing university inventions with its status as a land grant institution,
charged with assisting industry. How could it remain a collaborator with industry rather than becoming a competitor?92
During World War II, huge amounts of research dollars
began pouring into American universities.93 A group of academics
convinced the federal government that universities could develop
military technologies, and universities, not industry, were selected
to manage major research programs.94 Major military research centers were established at MIT, Johns Hopkins, Berkeley, Chicago,


MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 64; ETZKOWITZ, supra note 86, at 60.
The committee was chaired by Vannevar Bush, then dean of the School of Engineering. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 64.
88 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 64 (citing MIT Patent Committee
Statement of Patent Procedure, MIT Archives, AC64, Box 1).
89 ETZKOWITZ, supra note 86, at 67. MIT cancelled its agreement with the
Research Corporation in 1963 following a dispute over a license to IBM for
magnetic core memory technologies. Id. at 76.
90 Id. at 61.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 62–64.
93 Id. at 48.
94 Id. at 46–47. This marked a major departure from the way that research
efforts were handled during World War I.
87
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and Columbia, where faculty members focused on nuclear physics, electronics, and a few other technologies that were key to the
military effort.95 In the post-war era, the federal government
continued to fund university research, and some agencies, such
as the National Institutes of Health, expanded their research
programs dramatically.96 Annalee Saxenian writes, “The Second
World War and the ensuing Cold War recast the economic landscape of the United States. The federal government spurred the
growth of new industries and regions by channeling resources to
university labs to develop war-related technologies.”97
Despite the federal investments in university research,
formal IP policies were somewhat slow to respond. In a 1948
study of university patent policies, Archie Palmer observed that
there was a wide diversity of practice among educational institutions, and even within institutions, regarding the handling of
patentable inventions growing out of scientific research.98 Palmer
reported that only 37 institutions had adopted patent policies at
that time: half had been adopted since 1942, and some related only
to sponsored research.99 Compulsory assignment of patent rights
was not mandated at most universities, except when it was required as a result of sponsored research.100 Instead, “voluntary
assignment is preferred.”101 At institutions without formal patent
policies, inventors were generally under no obligation to assign
rights to the university, although they were sometimes encouraged to work with outside non-profit research foundations which
would manage and attempt to commercialize their inventions.102
However, in a subsequent study published in 1962,103 Palmer
reported that the number of universities with formalized IP policies had increased to 147, while another 200 schools observed
generally accepted practices in the treatment of intellectual

Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 52.
97 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
98 PALMER, supra note 69, at 15–17.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 16.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 22.
103 ARCHIE M. PALMER, UNIVERSITY PATENTS AND PATENT POLICIES, PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES (National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC, 1962).
95
96
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property.104 Attitudes and practices relating to ownership of inventions were beginning to change.105 While compulsory assignment
of patent rights was not “considered desirable,” except when it was
necessary for sponsored research, voluntary assignment was “preferred” in many institutions.106 Nevertheless, Palmer reported:
Products of academic or institutionally sponsored research conducted by faculty members and other employees as a regular
part of their teaching and research responsibilities, especially
when patentable, require specific policy determination. When
the discovery or invention is directly related to the official duties
and responsibilities of the inventor, it is usually the practice
to require assignment of title to the institution or its designated agent, with appropriate recognition of the equities of
the inventor.107

Palmer also determined there was little uniformity in the
way that sponsored research was handled, with some universities
willing to conduct projects only when the university received complete control over publication and intellectual property rights, while
others allowed the sponsor to take title to patents and research
results.108 Palmer also observed a disturbing trend: many universities were placing an increasing emphasis on applied as opposed
to basic research.109 Indeed, by 1962 more than 100 universities
were receiving patent management services from the Research
Corporation or Battelle Development Corporation, another patent management organization.110 Most institutions “recognize[d]

Id. at 4–6. Another 596 universities reported that they conducted little
or no scientific research and did not have a formal patent policy. Id.
105 Id. at 5.
106 Id. at 10.
107 Id. at 28. It is unclear whether Palmer’s reference to inventions that are
directly related to the official duties and responsibilities of the inventor refers to
employees who were “hired to invent,” or whether he is referring to the general teaching and research responsibilities of an average faculty member.
108 Id. at 9.
109 Id. at 21.
110 Id. at 11. Palmer noted that
[m]ost universities and colleges endeavor to avoid becoming
involved in the intricate and commercial aspects of patent
management, mainly because they do not have the personnel
with the requisite specialized knowledge and experience. They
recognize that patent management is a complicated undertaking,
that it is expensive and that it demands a high degree of legal
104
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the rights and interests of the inventor in his invention” and shared
any proceeds from licensing or sale of the patents.111
The economic downturn of the 1970s (known to economists as “The Great Inflation”) led to another round of changes
in the technology transfer landscape.112 Likely due to its own
financial difficulties, the Research Corporation began encouraging
universities to assume initial responsibility for evaluating the
patentability and commercial potential of faculty inventions.113 A
patent awareness program launched, in 1973, ultimately resulted
in the creation of university technology transfer offices that were
intended to induce faculty members to disclose inventions which
could then be managed by the Research Corporation, but the
result was that the universities themselves took on a much larger
role in patenting and licensing activities while the Research Corporation continued to decline in importance.114
At the same time that universities were increasing their
in-house patenting capabilities, Congress was once again debating whether the government should hold title to inventions made
with federal funds or whether patents resulting from federally
funded research should be owned by research institutions (i.e.,
industry or universities).115 In three controversial cases in the


competence, administrative astuteness and promotional zeal—a
combination of talent that is not always readily available in
an educational institution.
Id. at 38.
111 Id. at 10.
112 See Brian K. Krumm, University Technology Transfer—Profit Centers or
Black Holes: Moving Toward a More Productive University Innovation Ecosystem
Policy, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 176 (2016) (“Global economic conditions in the 1970s compounded the private sector’s frustrations in attempting
to commercialize inventions. America was facing a recession due, in part, to a
reduction in the nation’s competitiveness in international markets. ... America
faced a slowdown in technological innovation.”).
113 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 75.
114 Id. at 75–76.
115 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1671 (1996) (“The question of who should own title to these research
results has been the subject of heated debate at least since World War II,
when unprecedented levels of federal spending on research and development
to support the war effort focused the attention of the federal government on
the issue.”). However, Mowery observes that while these debates commenced
at the end of World War II, universities were largely ignored during the 1940s
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1960s, the government claimed ownership of university inventions resulting from federally funded research: Gatorade (invented
at the University of Florida), 5-fluorouracil (a chemotherapy drug
developed at the University of Wisconsin), and the phenylketonuria test.116 There was an increasing concern that the public
was being denied access to beneficial discoveries and inventions
because the government owned the rights to those inventions and
refused to grant exclusive licenses, thereby preventing them
from being developed and commercialized in a meaningful way.117
In response to these criticisms, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare established a system of Institutional Patent
Agreements in the late 1960s that allowed universities with approved technology transfer operations to hold title to inventions
made with NIH funding and to grant exclusive licenses to industry
partners.118 The National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense instituted similar programs, but there was little
uniformity in the treatment of patent rights resulting from federally funded research.119
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980120 was the end product of these
debates, which ultimately concluded that the most efficient solution was to allow “contractors”121 (including universities)122 to retain


and 1950s because universities accounted for a relatively small percentage of
federally funded research and development at that time. MOWERY ET AL.,
supra note 70, at 87.
116 Loise & Stevens, supra note 6, at 1.
117 Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER
93, 94 (2004); see Loise & Stevens, supra note 6, at 1 (“Research was literally
described in this period as being ‘contaminated’ by federal funding because of
the government’s licensing policies.”).
118 Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L.J. 1, 1, 30 (2013). Lee
argues that the patent system should sometimes treat academic entities differently than other actors, a concept he calls “academic exceptionalism,” and he
documents a recent trend in that direction. Id.
119 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 88.
120 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–11). The Act became effective on July 1, 1981.
121 The term “contractor” means any person, small business firm, or non-profit
organization that is a party to a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement
with any federal agency for the performance of experimental, developmental,
or research work funded in whole or in part by the federal government. See
35 U.S.C. § 201(b), (c) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Nov. 2, 2002).
122 The Act clearly provides that the term “nonprofit organization” means
universities and other institutions of higher education. See § 201(i).
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title to inventions made with federal funding.123 A number of
universities, including those that were already actively engaged
in patenting and licensing, lobbied for the introduction of the bill
and its eventual adoption.124 The Act claimed multiple objectives:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum
participation of small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to promote collaboration between
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including
universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to
promote free competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the
United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure
that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and
protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies
in this area.125

The Bayh-Dole Act provides that universities and other
contractors may elect to retain title to federally funded inventions by following three simple steps: (1) disclose the invention
to the federal agency within a reasonable amount of time after it
becomes known to the university’s patent administrator; (2) make
a written election to retain title within two years after disclosure to
the federal agency; and (3) agree to file timely patent applications
in the United States and any other countries in which it wishes
to retain title.126 In return, the federal government receives a

§ 201(c); see also 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended
Sept. 16, 2011).
124 MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 89. Mowery includes references to
other studies indicating that universities were unhappy with a review of their
patent policies ordered by HEW, prompting university representatives to
approach Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole about introducing the bill.
University licensing officials also actively participated in drafting portions of
the proposed legislation. Id.
125 35 U.S.C. § 200 (Dec. 12, 1980; amended Nov. 1, 2000).
126 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1)–(3) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Sept. 16, 2011). If
the university fails to promptly disclose an invention or elect to retain title
within the stated time, the federal government may receive title to the invention. Similarly, if the university fails to file patent applications in the U.S. or
123
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nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice the invention throughout the world.127 The federal government
also retains “march-in” rights, allowing it to grant an exclusive
or nonexclusive license to a third party, where the university
has not taken steps to achieve practical application of the invention within a reasonable time or where such action is necessary
to alleviate health or safety needs that are not being satisfied by
the university or its licensees.128 Universities are required to
share any licensing revenues with the inventors, although no
specific distribution percentages are set forth in the act.129
Following the adoption of Bayh-Dole, university administrators continued to amend their IP policies to expand claims of
ownership over inventions created on campus, even claiming
rights in the inventions of students, visitors, and other members
of the university community.130 Some policies justify these broad
ownership claims based on the requirements of the Bayh-Dole
Act and other federal laws.131 MIT’s Policy Statements relating
to patents provide:
Research contracts sponsored by the Federal Government are
subject to statutes and regulations under which MIT acquires
title in inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in the
performance of the research. MIT’s ownership is subject to a
nonexclusive license to the government and the requirement


foreign countries, the federal government may receive title to the invention in
any country where patent applications have not been filed. Id.
127 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Sept. 16, 2011).
128 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Jan. 4, 2011).
129 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Sept. 16, 2011).
130 See American University Patent Policies: A Brief History, AM. ASS’N OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/ShortHistory
.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAC3-HPNW]. According to the AAUP, during the period
1981–2011,
[u]niversities adopt and revise patent policies, replacing invention equity with ownership claims. Universities ... expand
ownership claims to include use of resources and participation
in extramural research. Some universities also expand definition of “invention” to include “inventions that are not patentable”
while others conflate inventions, copyrights, and data under a
general heading of “intellectual property” or claim by an arbitrary
definition ownership of a broad range of assets, listing variously
inventions, works, data, materials, scholarship, and expertise.
Id.
131 Id.
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that MIT retain title and take effective steps to develop the practical applications of the invention by licensing and other means.132

Pennsylvania State University’s policy declares that its
requirement that all members of the university (including administrators, faculty, staff, graduate and undergraduate students,
and others) sign an intellectual property agreement arises from
the university’s “obligations” under the Bayh-Dole Act.133
However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the BayhDole Act only applies to federally funded research, not to industrysponsored research or research that is supported by university
funds.134 Nevertheless, it appears that many universities seized
upon Bayh-Dole as a justification to claim ownership of all research
conducted on campus, rather than limiting their ownership claims
to federally funded research.135
At the same time that the Bayh-Dole Act was being deliberated in Congress, the United States Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, holding that a genetically
engineered bacterium injected with oil degrading plasmids constituted a manufacture or a composition of matter that was entitled to patent protection.136 The Chakrabarty decision has often
been credited with creating the legal foundation for the biotechnology industry that was born in university laboratories in the 1980s
when Herbert Boyer (University of California at San Francisco)

Guide to the Ownership, Distribution and Commercial Development of
MIT Technology, MASS. INST. OF TECH., https://tlo.mit.edu/sites/default/files/MIT
-TLO-ownership-guide_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/76T3-E98A]. Similarly, the website
of Northwestern University states that its Patent and Invention Policy largely
stems from the Bayh-Dole Act. See University Patent and Invention Policy, NW.
UNIV., https://www.invo.northwestern.edu/invention-disclosure/policies-forms
/patent-invention-policy.html [http://perma.cc/3BX9-8HPS].
133 Ownership and Management of Intellectual Property, PA. STATE UNIV.,
https://policy.psu.edu/sections/intellectual-property-policies [https://perma.cc
/N23N-7LUG].
134 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Dec. 12, 1980; last amended Nov. 2, 2002); 35 U.S.C.
§ 200 (Dec. 12, 1980; amended Nov. 1, 2000).
135 See IP policies cited supra notes 25–27, where universities claim ownership
of all intellectual property created by members of the university community.
136 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). In support of its decision, the Court famously cited the Committee Reports accompanying the
1952 Patent Act, which stated that Congress intended patent eligible subject
matter to include “anything under the sun that is made by man.” Id.
132
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and Stanley Cohen (Stanford University School of Medicine) invented recombinant DNA technologies.137 Peter Lee concludes
that “[t]his constellation of legal, economic, and scientific developments created a perfect storm that helped fuel a rapid rise in
university patenting after 1980.”138
B.Judicial Treatment of IP Policies After the Bayh-Dole Act
When the enforceability of university patent policies and
agreements was called into question after Bayh-Dole, courts
often ignored established principles of employment law and
went to great lengths to avoid holding that the policies and/or
agreements were not binding on university personnel.139 For
example, in University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman,140 the University of Pennsylvania’s patent management corporation brought an
action against Kligman, a tenured professor, seeking royalties in
connection with an invention he made, and also seeking a declaration of ownership in Kligman’s patent.141 The university alleged that Kligman breached his employment contract with the
university and also breached its patent policy,142 which stated that
“any invention or discovery which may result from work carried
out on University time or at University expense by special grants or
otherwise is the property of the University.”143 The Patent Policy
was allegedly mailed to faculty members and then published in
a 110-page Research Investigator’s Handbook describing various

SALLY SMITH HUGHES, GENENTECH: THE BEGINNINGS OF BIOTECH 150–51
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2011).
138 Lee, supra note 118, at 35. Lee reports that in 1965, the USPTO granted
only 96 patents to 28 U.S. universities. Id. However, in 1992, almost 1,500 patents were granted to over 150 universities, and by 2002, U.S. universities
were receiving more than 3,000 patents per year. Id. According to Lee’s calculations, from 1980 to 2005, the number of patents granted to U.S. research
institutions increased by more than 480 percent. Id. Note that Lee also credits
the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as contributing
to the rise in university patenting, because he believes it created a climate that
was more conducive to filing patent applications. Id. at 34.
139 See Univ. Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1228–29 (E.D.
Pa. 1991).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1213.
142 Id. at 1213–14.
143 Id. at 1215.
137
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university policies and procedures.144 Although the policy required
researchers to sign a Patent Agreement, agreeing to disclose inventions and execute assignment documents and other forms necessary for filing patent applications, there was no evidence that
Kligman, a tenured faculty member, ever signed such an agreement; in fact, the court determined that the university generally
did not enforce compliance with the requirement to sign a Patent
Agreement with any vigor.145
The district court acknowledged that under Pennsylvania
law, an assignment of a patent must be in writing and must show a
clear and unmistakable intent to transfer ownership.146 Further,
an agreement to assign a patent in the future (i.e., an executory
contract) can be in writing or can be implied from the circumstances; however, an employer-employee relationship does not
automatically entitle the employer to assignment of inventions
made in the course of employment.147 Instead, an employer will
only be entitled to assignment of an employee’s inventions if the
employee is a party to a contract requiring assignment or where
the employee is hired to invent a particular product.148 Even
where an employee uses the time or facilities of the employer to
make an invention, the employer is only entitled to a “shop right”
(i.e., a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to use the invention).149
There was clearly no written contract between Kligman
and Penn; instead, Penn argued that the university’s handbook
and policies resulted in an implied contract that required Kligman
to assign his invention to the university.150 The district court
noted that, at least in the context of patent rights, courts have
been reluctant to imply a contract to assign invention rights,

Id. at 1215, 1224.
Id. at 1225. Interestingly, a Penn administrator testified in deposition
that the Patent Agreement forms were not even included in the 1983 edition of
the Faculty Handbook because “[f[ederal laws changed. There was a uniform
government patent policy implemented, Public Law 96517; and it was felt
under the new law that these kinds of sign-offs weren’t required for Federal
grants.” Id. Apparently, Penn believed that the Bayh-Dole Act gave the university title in faculty inventions ab initio and that faculty members had no
rights to assign. Id.
146 Id. at 1219.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1219–20.
149 Id. (citing United States v. Dubilier, 289 U.S. 178, 187–89 (1933)).
150 Id. at 1220–21.
144
145
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and it recognized that several Pennsylvania courts previously
held that an employer’s unilateral act of publishing a handbook
did not create a contract that bound the employee.151 Rather, the
question was what a reasonable employee would believe with
regard to the handbook.152 The court observed that the language
of Penn’s Patent Agreement and related forms were intended to
be enforceable contracts, but the court concluded, “[i]t cannot be
said, however, that any reasonable person receiving the handbook,
without more, would have understood himself to be bound by the
terms of a form agreement he never executed.”153 Yet, amazingly,
the court held that there was some scant evidence that Kligman
was aware of the Patent Policy and manifested an intent to be
bound by it.154 Therefore, despite its extensive discussion of the
laws which seemed to favor Kligman, the court refused to enter
summary judgment in his favor, holding that genuine issues of
material fact existed about whether an implied contract to assign
the patent existed between Kligman and Penn.155
Similarly, in Chou v. University of Chicago,156 the Federal
Circuit determined that Chou, a graduate student, was obligated
to assign her inventions to the university.157 Even though Chou
never signed a written contract, the court found that she accepted
her academic appointment subject to the administrative policies
of the university, including its patent policy stating that “[e]very
patentable invention or discovery that results from research or
other activities carried out at the University, or with the aid of
its facilities or funds administered by it, shall be the property of the
University, and shall be assigned, as determined by the University....”158 The court made that finding despite the fact that the
faculty handbook, in which the patent policy was contained, stated,

Id. at 1223 (citing Richardson v. Charles Cole Mem’l Hosp., 320 Pa. Super. 106, 108–09 (1983) and Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (University of Pennsylvania policies and procedures not legally binding
on employee)).
152 Id. (citing Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa. Super. 199, 511
A.2d. 830, alloc. denied, 514 Pa. 643, 523 A.2d 1132 (1987)).
153 Id. at 1226.
154 Id. at 1228.
155 Id. at 1229.
156 Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
157 Id. at 1356.
158 Id. at 1357.
151
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“[t]he contents of this handbook do not create a contract or
agreement between an individual and the University.”159
Another panel of the Federal Circuit held that a graduate
student at West Virginia University (WVU) was obligated to
assign an antenna patent to WVU, where WVU had a patent policy
stating that it owned “worldwide right, title and interest in any
invention made at least in party by University personnel,” which
included all full- and part-time members of the faculty and staff
and all other university employees, including graduate and undergraduate students and fellows.160 The court had little sympathy
for the student’s claims that assignment was merely an option
for him to elect or reject, not an obligation, and that he was not
given a copy of the patent policy or informed that it applied to
him before he made the invention in question.161 Similarly, in
Regents of the University of New Mexico v. Knight, the court held
that a professor and a staff member at the University of New
Mexico (UNM) were contractually bound by UNM’s Patent Policy
stating that inventions “belong to” UNM, along with a Co-Inventor
Agreement stating that UNM was the owner of the inventions.162 The professor, Scallen, entered into a written contract
with UNM each year that incorporated the Patent Policy contained in a faculty handbook.163 Knight, the staff member, had
no written contract with UNM, but the court still concluded that
under New Mexico law, the UNM patent policy created an implied contract between Knight and the university.164 See also,

Id. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the statement had to be read in
light of another statement in the handbook, providing that the basic terms and
conditions of employment are set out in an employee’s appointment letter. Id.
Chou’s letter stated that her appointment was subject to the administrative
policies of the university. Id. However, the court did hold that the university
could be liable to Chou under the doctrine of respondeat superior because her
advisor allegedly concealed the fact that he had misappropriated her inventions.
See infra note 201 and accompanying text regarding potential fiduciary duty
of a university to its students.
160 Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
161 Id. at 1298.
162 Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
163 Id. at 1118.
164 Id. The court was not persuaded by Scallen and Knight’s argument
that UNM’s claim of initial ownership of the inventions was contrary to law,
159
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St. John’s University, New York v. Bolton,165 refusing to dismiss
St. John’s claim that its patent policy required a professor and a
graduate student to assign rights in a pharmaceutical invention
to the university.166 The court rejected the policy arguments of
the professor and student, who contended that the language in
St. John’s patent policy was so broad as to constitute an unenforceable “mortgage on a man’s brain.”167
In each of these cases, the courts’ treatment of university
IP policies and faculty handbooks differed substantially from the
way they handled the employee handbooks and corporate policies
of other types of entities.168 In a corporate employer-employee setting, courts were generally unwilling to find that handbooks and
policies formed binding agreements between the parties (e.g.,
employee handbooks did not convert at-will employment to a situation where an employee could only be discharged for cause).169
At least one state even passed legislation declaring that
inventions made at a state college or university would be owned
by that institution.170 Under Ohio law:
All rights to and interests in discoveries, inventions, or patents which result from research or investigation conducted in
any experiment station, bureau, laboratory, research facility, or
other facility of any state college or university, or by employees of any state college or university acting within the scope of
their employment or with funding, equipment, or infrastructure provided by or through any state college or university, shall
be the sole property of that college or university.171



including the U.S. Constitution, 35 U.S.C. § 261, and case law holding that
an invention belongs to its inventor until it is assigned to another. Id.
165 St. John’s Univ., N.Y. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
166 Id. at 152.
167 Id. at 161. The court stated, “[f]ederal courts have consistently upheld the
validity of patent-assignment obligations imposed on university students, faculty,
and staff as a condition of their research activities at the university.” Id.
168 See Knight, 321 F.3d at 1118–19; Univ. of W. Va., Bd. of Trs. v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d
1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 161; Univ. Patents, Inc. v.
Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1219–20, 1223 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
169 See Kligman, 762 F. Supp. at 1219–20, 1223.
170 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Okuley, 344 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2003).
171 OHIO REV. CODE § 3345.14(B), as cited by E.I Du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Okuley, 344 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The Sixth Circuit raised a question about the constitutionality of that statute under the Takings Clause;172 however, it
remains the law in Ohio today.173
C.Stanford v. Roche—A Milestone in Treatment of University
Inventions?
Judicial treatment of university patent rights changed
abruptly in 2011 when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc., holding that the Bayh-Dole Act does
not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in
federal contractors.174 Mark Holodniy joined Stanford as a research fellow in the Department of Infectious Diseases in 1988
and signed a Copyright and Patent Agreement stating that he
“agree[d] to assign” to Stanford his “right, title and interest in”
inventions resulting from his research at the university, where he
was engaged in developing an improved method for quantifying
levels of HIV in patients’ blood samples using PCR (the polymerase chain reaction technique, developed at Cetus).175 In order to
increase his familiarity with PCR, Holodniy’s supervisor arranged
for him to conduct research at Cetus.176 However, Cetus required
Holodniy to sign a conflicting agreement stating that he “will
assign and do[es] hereby assign” to Cetus his “right, title and interest in each of the ideas, inventions, and improvements” made as
a result of his work at Cetus.177 At Cetus, Holodniy created a
PCR-based procedure for calculating the amount of HIV in a
patient’s blood.178 He then returned to Stanford and, along with
other employees who assisted him in testing and refining the process, gave a written assignment of rights to Stanford.179 Stanford
obtained three patents on Holodniy’s HIV quantification method.180

Okuley, 344 F.3d at 585.
§ 3345.14(B).
174 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (2011).
175 Id. at 2192.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
172
173
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Subsequently, Roche (a medical diagnostics company) acquired
Cetus’ PCR-related assets (including rights Cetus obtained from
Holodniy) and commercialized Holodniy’s HIV measurement
technique.181
In 2005, Stanford sued Roche for infringing its patents on
the PCR technique.182 Roche defended by arguing that it was a
co-owner of the HIV quantification method based on Holodniy’s
assignment of rights to Cetus, but Stanford countered by claiming that Holodniy had no rights to assign.183 Stanford contended
that because its HIV research was federally funded by the NIH,
it automatically owned all rights in the invention under the
Bayh-Dole Act.184 The district court sided with Stanford and
determined that Holodniy had no interest to assign to Cetus, but
the Federal Circuit disagreed.185 The appeals court held that
Holodniy’s agreement with Stanford constituted a mere “promise to assign rights in the future,” whereas his agreement with
Cetus actually assigned rights in the invention to Cetus.186
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
Federal Circuit.187 The Court confirmed that rights in inventions
belong to their inventors188 and stated, “[a]lthough much in intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since the first
Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the right to patent
their inventions has not.”189 While an inventor can assign his rights
in an invention to a third party, an employer does not have rights in
an employee’s invention unless the inventor expressly grants his
rights in the invention to the employer.190 The Court held that
the Bayh-Dole Act did not change that basic principle.191 To the
contrary, if Congress had intended for Bayh-Dole to vest ownership of federally funded inventions in the university, it would

Id.
Id. at 2193.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2194.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 2195 (emphasis added).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 2195–96.
181
182
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have clearly provided that title to such inventions was owned by
the contractor (i.e., the university).192 Instead, when the BayhDole Act provides that a contractor may elect to retain title, “it
simply assures contractors that they may keep title to whatever
it is they already have.”193 That is, “[t]he Bayh-Dole Act does not
confer title to federally funded inventions on contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to those inventions.”194
One might have expected that, following Stanford v. Roche,
universities would have rushed to amend their IP policies and
agreements and bring them into line with the Court’s holding.195
Surprisingly, few changes have occurred.196 The American Association of University Professors complains:
Universities generally ignore Stanford v. Roche decision in their
policies and guidance documents. Some universities, notably



192 Id. at 2195. The Court observed that on those few occasions in the past
when Congress has divested inventors of their rights in inventions, it has
“provided unambiguously” that those inventions become the property of the
United States (e.g., inventions belonging to the Atomic Energy Commission,
NASA, or the Department of Energy). Id.
193 Id. at 2197.
194 Id. The Court noted that agencies that provide funding to contractors
expect those contractors to obtain invention assignments from their employees. Id. For instance, NIH guidance documents clearly provide that “[b]y law,
an inventor has initial ownership of an invention,” and contractors should
utilize assignment agreements to obtain ownership of inventions. Id. at 2199.
195 See Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 453, 500 (2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court reached
the correct decision in the Stanford case for economic and policy reasons).
196 Stanford’s policy on Inventions, Patents and Licensing states:
All potentially patentable inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in whole or in part by members of the faculty
or staff (including student employees) of the University in the
course of their University responsibilities or with more than incidental use of University resources, shall be disclosed on a timely
basis to the University. Title to such inventions shall be assigned
to the University, regardless of the source of funding, if any.
Research Policy Handbook § 9.1 Inventions, Patents, and Licensing, supra note
61. The policy also states that all faculty, staff, student employees, graduate
students, and postdoctoral fellow must sign the Stanford University Patent and
Copyright Agreement, and each department is responsible for ensuring that
the agreement has been signed. Research Policy Handbook § 9.2(2)(C), STAN.
UNIV., https://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/research-policy-handbook/intel
lectual-property/copyright-policy [https://perma.cc/Z9Zn-2RNY]. The agreement
does not appear to be available for public viewing.
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Stanford, University of California, and University of Washington
insert “present assignment” language into policy and employment
documents, purporting to enact “automatic” assignment of any
future inventions made by faculty. Advocates argue that such
draconic ownership policies are necessary to preserve the institutional technology licensing industry that has been created
around faculty inventions, and without this industry in place
inventions will “sit on the shelf” and America will become a global
technology backwater.197

Thus, despite the Stanford case, and as the survey of IP policies in Part I confirms, most universities continue to make blanket
claims of ownership in university inventions, sometimes even
claiming that ownership automatically vests in the university.198
It seems apparent that changes need to be made in the
way that most universities handle their technology transfer
functions, particularly with respect to the assertions of invention
ownership contained in their IP policies.199 I offer two proposals
for addressing the situation. One is a more conservative set of
revisions that could be implemented immediately by universities, but which would make meaningful alterations to most universities’ policies and procedures. The other is a more long-ranging
proposal that considers opportunities to reshape the current
landscape and place the university in a role where it supports
the activities of university inventors and entrepreneurs.
III.A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR SHORT-TERM CHANGE
If universities are going to claim ownership rights over
inventions made by members of the university community, several
changes must be implemented immediately.
First, tuition-paying students should not be required to assign their inventions to the university. Undergraduates, graduate
students who are not supported by the university (for example,
many students in the arts and humanities), and professional

American University Patent Policies: A Brief History, AM. ASS’N OF
UNIV. PROFESSORS 2, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/ShortHistory
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HP7-9Z8P].
198 See Inventions and Related Property Rights, supra note 28.
199 See Brian Cummings, The Changing Landscape of Intellectual Property
Management as a Revenue-Generating Asset for U.S. Research Universities, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1027, 1046 (2014).
197
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school students (e.g., law students and business students) should
own their inventions, absent some extraordinary circumstances.200
Unless a student is also an employee of the university, such as a
research assistant or a technician in a professor’s laboratory
who might be in a position to contribute to an invention or other
technology, then treating a student like a university employee
simply does not make any sense. Merely receiving federal or
state financial aid or a university scholarship should not convert
a student into a pseudo-employee. Indeed, it could even be argued
that claiming ownership of student inventions is a breach of the
university’s fiduciary duties to its students.201
In some limited instances, a student may enroll in a creditbearing course such as a capstone or an externship that is supported by an outside sponsor.202 At some universities, industry
sponsors provide financial support for engineering capstone courses,
designate company employees to act as mentors to capstone teams,
and may even provide research data or other proprietary information to form the basis of a team project; in return, the sponsor
may require that any intellectual property created in the capstone
be assigned to the sponsor.203 Likewise, students participating in

For an interesting discussion about student inventors, see Samantha
Stainburn, Who Owns Your Great Idea?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes
.com/2009/01/04/education/edlife/whoseidea-t.html [https://perma.cc/69D7-PHUJ].
See also Bryce C. Pilz, Student Intellectual Property Issues on the Entrepreneurial
Campus, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 1, 27 (2012).
201 Several commentators have argued that the university-student relationship is a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch,
An Analytical Framework for Understanding and Evaluating the Fiduciary
Duties of Educators, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 159, 160 (2005); see also J.
DOUGLAS TOMA, MANAGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY: LEGAL ISSUES
AND COMMERCIAL REALITIES (Routledge 2011) (“The historical parental relationship with the institution has evolved into a contractual one, with higher
education no longer regarded as a privilege, but instead deemed a purchased
good.”); Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University
Faculty and Administrators, 29 J.C. & U.L. 153, 162–70 (2002) (discussing
research opportunities and ownership of patents).
202 See, e.g., Computing, and Cyber Systems Capstone, N. ARIZ. UNIV. SCH.
OF INFORMATICS, https://nau.edu/school-of-informatics-computing-and-cyber-sys
tems/capstone/ [https://perma.cc/2FTB-N99Q]; Georgia Tech Capstone Design,
https://capstone.gatech.edu/sponsors/ [https://perma.cc/Y7GX-QUDY].
203 See, e.g., Pennsylvania State University Department of Agricultural
and Biological Engineering, https://abe.psu.edu/industry/capstone-design [https://
200
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externships may be placed in a position where they could create
an invention or other technology that will be claimed by the host.204
In these settings, students should be informed in advance that
the sponsor or host will own any IP created during the capstone,
externship, or similar activity, and that the students will be
required to assign their innovations to the sponsor. For required
courses like engineering capstones, the students must also be
provided an alternative to participating in the sponsored activity,
so that they will have an opportunity to own their inventions
and creations, and they should not be penalized if they do not
elect to participate in the sponsored research.
Next, if universities are going to require faculty, staff and
other employees to assign inventions to the university, then they
must revise their IP policies to more accurately reflect the state
of the law.205 Universities should eliminate language that incorrectly suggests that ownership of inventions created by faculty
and other employees will automatically vest in the university.206
Instead, they should replace such language with a provision that
clearly states that the employee is required to assign intellectual
property to the university as a condition of employment. Educational institutions might consider adopting a provision along the
following lines:


perma.cc/S99T-EHKG] (“The university Intellectual Property Agreement will
provide the sponsor with ownership of all intellectual property that is developed during the course of the project.”).
204 See, e.g., Guidelines for Sponsors of Capstone Senior Design Projects at
VCU College of Engineering (CoEgr) 2, https://egr.vcu.edu/media/school-of-engine
ering/capstone-files/documents/CapstoneSponsorGuidelines.pdf [https://perma
.cc/Y9ZG-XRVW] (“To provide IP protection to the sponsor’s project, the VCU
College of Engineering has a straight-forward, client-friendly approach for
undergraduate students to assign these rights to the sponsor. Sponsors have
until September 30th to request students assign any IP generated on their
project to the sponsoring company.”).
205 It could be argued that if universities are going to follow the model of
high technology companies and claim ownership rights in the work of their
faculty and staff employees, then universities should start acting more like
corporations and be held to the same standards. But see Changing University
IP Policy to Support Academic Freedom and Innovation, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS 3, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/ApproachIPpolicy
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TBP-P334] (arguing that corporate IP practices do not
work in universities).
206 See supra notes 174–99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stanford
v. Roche.
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As a condition of my employment with the University, I hereby
assign and agree to assign in the future to the University all
rights, title, and interest in and to any and all Inventions conceived or reduced to practice by me, either alone or jointly with
others, that are made with the use of University facilities, resources, or funding, including sponsored research activities
administered by the University, or within the scope of my employment with the University.

Such a provision accomplishes three important goals: (1)
it demonstrates that there is consideration for the agreement;
(2) it contains a present assignment and a promise to assign in
the future; and (3) it limits the scope of any such assignment to
inventions made with university resources or funding, or falling
within the scope of employment.207
Finally, all members of the university community subject
to the IP policy and claims of university ownership should be
made aware of the policy and its implications on their work.
Universities should stop burying their IP policies on their websites, deeply embedded under obscure titles, or in the appendices
of lengthy faculty handbooks; they need to be brought to the
forefront where they can be easily accessed by stakeholders and
other interested parties. For new employees, IP policies should be
discussed and explained in “onboarding” or orientation programs.
Further, the policies should be written in language that makes
sense to non-lawyers, and they should be organized in a comprehensible manner. A policy that has such a profound impact on
the rights of faculty and staff should be accessible, and it should
be understandable.
Implementing these modest proposals will result in a more
equitable and transparent environment on campus, where faculty,
staff, and other employees have a clearer understanding of the
terms of their employment or appointment and the rights they
are required to forfeit to the university.
IV.A LONG-TERM PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The very basic proposals set out in Part III beg the question of whether university ownership and control over inventions


See also Parker Tresemer, Best Practices for Drafting University Technology
Assignment Agreements After Filmtec, Stanford v. Roche, and Patent Reform, 2012
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 347, 374–76 (2012) (proposing similar language).
207
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is a good thing, and whether it should be continued. While proponents of the model argue that university technology transfer
plays an important role in moving research from the laboratory
to the public,208 critics have identified numerous problems with
university ownership of inventions.209 In the first place, it appears that many universities are not particularly adept at carrying out the technology transfer function.210 A number of studies
have shown that most universities lose money on technology
transfer—the few exceptions are those universities that make
“big hits”211 like Gatorade or Neupogen.212 Technology transfer


Compare Randi B. Isaacs, Inside a University’s Technology Transfer Office:
Purposes and Goals for Protecting a University’s Intellectual Property, 8 No. 3
LANDSLIDE 30, 30 (2016), with Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab:
Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation,
59 ME. L. REV. 407, 418 (2007) (arguing that patent ownership could advance
research, if universities adopt effective patent management programs; Osenga
states, “there is some reason to believe that the parade of horribles attributed
to university patenting is unwarranted.”).
209 See, e.g., Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole
Act and the Current University Invention Ownership Model, 38 RES. POL’Y
1407, 1408 (“[T]he current university invention ownership model is plagued
by ineffective incentives, information asymmetries, and contradictory goals
for inventors, potential licensees, the university, and university technology licensing offices.”).
210 See Joseph Allen, Does University Patent Licensing Pay Off?, IP WATCHDOG
(Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/01/27/does-university-pat
ent-licensing-pay-off/id=47655/ [https://perma.cc/X2G8-RU99] (“most university
technology transfer offices (TTO’s) are not worth their cost because they are
not self-supporting through patent licensing income”) (citing University StartUps: Critical for Improving Technology Transfer, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2013)
(finding that universities spend the vast majority of their revenues rewarding
inventors or funding new research, not supporting technology transfer operations)); Cummings, supra note 199, at 1034 (university technology transfer is a
value-losing proposition in most cases; legal costs are extremely high and
consume as much as 60 percent of a tech transfer office’s budget, meaning
that few tech transfer offices can make money or even cover their costs).
211 Irene Abrams et al., How are U.S Technology Transfer Offices Tasked
and Motivated—Is It All About the Money?, 17 RES. MGMT REV. 18, 19–20
(2009) (documenting several “big hits” from 1990 through 2008; the authors
conclude that financial return is not the major motivator in technology transfer, but that universities need to invest in their TTOs in order to provide the
public with the benefits of academic research).
212 See Love, supra note 14, at 308 (concluding that universities spend
more obtaining and maintaining high-tech patents than they earn back in
overall royalties—based on the data he examined, Love determined that even
based on a set of very favorable assumptions, the patent activity reported by
208
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offices (TTOs) are notoriously understaffed and overworked, and the
TTO staff may not be composed of an appropriate combination of
attorneys, engineers and scientists, and marketing professionals.213
Faculty members are required to disclose their inventions
and then delegate all authority to the TTO to negotiate licenses.214
However, TTOs are typically rewarded by the university based
on the amount of revenue generated rather than the number of
inventions commercialized.215 As a result, TTOs have become
“gatekeepers rather than facilitators of commercialization.”216
Further, the “home run” mentality leads TTOs to focus their
efforts on technologies that seem to offer the largest and most
immediate returns, meaning that inventions with longer term
potential may be ignored.217
Faculty members and graduate students, on the other
hand, frequently resent the push to keep their inventions secret.218 They are told that they should not publish their research
results or share them at conferences, the types of activities that
provide professional recognition and may lead to tenure, but
instead they should work with their technology transfer office to
file a patent application.219 One commentator suggested that


participants in his survey would result in a negative rate of return of over
three percent); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing,
23 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 620, 629 (2007) (in 2004, 40 percent of TTOs
participating in the AUTM survey earned less than $600,000 after legal and
related fees, but before they paid the salaries of their employees); cf. David B.
Audretsch, Scientific Entrepreneurship: The Stealth Conduit of University
Knowledge Spillovers, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1015, 1025 (2014) (university
scientists are more prolific in their entrepreneurial activities that had been
reflected by previous studies based on AUTM data; over one in ten scientists
have started a business based on their scientific research).
213 Paul M. Swamidass & Venubabu Vulasa, Why University Inventions
Rarely Produce Income? Bottlenecks in University Technology Transfer, 34 J.
TECH. TRANSFER 343, 350 (2008) (observing that university technology transfer offices often have inadequate capacity to market university inventions).
214 Robert E. Litan, Lesa Mitchell & E.J. Reedy, Commercializing University Innovations: Alternative Approaches, 8 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON.
31, 41 (2007).
215 Id. (referring to this as the “revenue maximization model” of technology).
216 Id. at 43.
217 Id.
218 See Swamidass & Vulasa, supra note 213, at 345, 358.
219 Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Intellectual Property Revenue Sharing as a
Problem for University Technology Transfer, 49 AKRON L. REV. 647, 655–58
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university patent policies have given rise to the “patent police”,
who roam the halls of academia searching for inventions and
urging faculty members to keep their work secret.220 In any case,
faculty members may experience months of delays in publication
and dissemination of their research findings while they wait for
the TTO to file patent applications.221 In the meantime, a faculty
member at a different institution might make and publicize a competing discovery, stealing the limelight from the first researcher.222
Moreover, in many instances it seems that the TTOs simply
do not do a very good job of handling inventions.223 Consider the
following hypothetical: Professor Sally, a faculty member at a
university, invents something under a sponsored research agreement with federal funding or industry support. Under her university’s IP policy, the university claims ownership of all rights
in her invention, and Sally is required to promptly disclose the
invention to the technology transfer office. The TTO may choose
to file a provisional patent application, which will likely be based
largely on the disclosure document prepared by Sally, not an
application drafted by a patent attorney. In an effort to find a
licensee for Sally’s invention, the TTO then posts a description
of the invention on the website, thus making what is arguably a
public disclosure for patent law purposes. If no licensee is located,
the university may decide to return the invention to Sally, but
often that decision is not made until near the end of the twelvemonth deadline for filing a full utility application. As a result,
Sally (who does not understand the patent laws and the timing
implications) does not have time to locate a patent attorney and file
a nonprovisional application. Her provisional application goes
abandoned, she loses her priority date, and her invention may go
into the public domain due to the website posting and any other

(2016) (the academic research environment creates disincentives to disclosure
of inventions, including a sense of community based on free sharing of ideas,
fear that disclosure will lead to delay in publication or conference presentations, and a lack of education about patent law generally).
220 Love, supra note 14, at 323, 330.
221 Carter-Johnson, supra note 219, at 657.
222 See id. at 656 (illustrating that academic researchers are motivated
primarily by non-monetary goals like intellectual freedom and recognition for
their work).
223 See id. at 656–57 (discussing how academic researchers fear the publication
and patent filing delays that come with disclosing their innovations to TTOs).
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disclosures that were made in the interim. Unfortunately, that
is the situation that plays out all too often in universities today.224
As an alternative to seeking outside licensees, universities are increasingly pushing faculty members (whose expertise
is in science or engineering, not business management) to license
their inventions back from the university themselves and use those
inventions as the basis for starting a company.225 The startup
may pay an upfront, fixed licensing fee and/or may promise to pay
royalties to the university in the future, assuming that the invention is successfully commercialized.226 After repaying itself
for costs associated with patent prosecution, the university will
then distribute any remaining royalties.227 A portion will be paid
to the inventor, the inventor’s department or college may receive
a share, and the remainder is to be reinvested in research and
development at the university.228
A recent IP Watchdog article explained the drive to create
university startups:
Now, startups are the lifeblood of technology transfer. Classical licensing to large companies for very successful payoffs are
far and few between. The key reason for this is the fact that
most university technologies are very early stage and hence
licensed at a huge discount. Startups on the other hand are
de-risked through the maturation of the technologies and become very attractive acquisitions. Recent studies have shown
that technologies acquired from universities are orders of magnitude lower in value than acquisition of startups. Startups will
be the crown jewels of technology transfer in the future.229

In an effort to help ensure the success of the startup, the
university-licensor may encourage the new company to locate in a
university incubator, and university officials may even take an
active role in the day-to-day management of the company or may

See id.
See Dipanjan Nag, The Changing Face of University Technology Transfer, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/09/the
-changing-face-of-university-technology-transfer/id=88853/ [https://perma.cc/VX
6E-XRJG].
226 Id.
227 See Love, supra note 14, at 311.
228 See id.
229 Nag, supra note 225.
224
225
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assist with locating outside investments.230 However, the startup will likely be required to pay fees to the university for these
services, or the university may take an equity stake in the startup company.231
The university technology transfer-entrepreneurship shell
game is therefore deeply troubling and can lead to significant
potential conflicts of interest between the university and its faculty members. Some universities are apparently attempting to
turn their teaching and research faculty into income generators
for the school, and those faculty members may be diverted from
their traditional roles as educators and researchers.232 These concerns have led critics to question whether there is any appropriate role for the university or its technology transfer office to play
where the faculty inventor is interested in creating a startup
company to develop and commercialize his or her inventions.233
They argue that TTOs are only interested in enhancing licensing
revenues, not actually transferring technology to a company that
can bring it to practical realization for the benefit of the public.234 They also point out that faculty members understand their
inventions better than TTO staff members and have closer connections to industry members and potential licensees, and therefore
faculty inventors may be in a better position to ensure that the
invention is brought to practical application.235

Id.
Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1411.
232 See id. at 1413 (illustrating the difference in the structure of work between university professors and corporate researchers).
233 See id. at 1411 (“If the inventor is intent upon establishing a firm, there is
no economic reason for university TLO involvement.”); cf. Liza Vertinsky,
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 2011–14
(2012) (discussing several more effective examples of technology transfer to
university startups, including the Universities of Wisconsin, Utah, Michigan
and Maryland).
234 Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1410, 1419.
235 Id. at 1411. Cf. Samuel Estreicher & Kristina A. Yost, University IP: The
University as Coordinator of the Team Production Process, 91 IND. L.J. 1081,
1103–04 (2016) (arguments in favor of faculty ownership of inventions are not
well developed; while there may be room for improvement in the technology
transfer process, such as adoption of best practices, there is insufficient
evidence to support a change in the current model of university ownership
of faculty inventions.).
230
231
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The effect of the technology transfer function on education
can also be questioned. If technology transfer ultimately takes
industry relationships out of the hands of faculty members and
places them in the hands of the university and TTO, this may
result in a disservice to students.236 Interference with facultyindustry relationships may jeopardize industry involvement with
capstone projects and result in less support for other student research projects.237 It may also lead to reduced opportunities for
student employment after graduation.238 Further, if TTOs almost
always lose money, one could question whether that eventually
translates into increased tuition costs for students.239
A.Is There a Better Model that Could Be Implemented?
All of these concerns about the efficacy and propriety of
university technology transfer operations have caused academics
and other commentators to ask whether there is a better model that
could be implemented in order to move more inventions out of the
university.240 One group believes that the Bayh-Dole Act must be
amended in order to ensure that university inventions reach the
public, although their proposed amendments take various forms.241
One proposal suggests that Bayh-Dole should be amended to remove the requirement that the university file patent applications, since not all inventions need to be patented in order to be
commercialized.242 Conversely, the Act might be changed to explicitly recognize that in the university setting, faculty members are
the “contractors,” not the universities, thereby placing ownership of inventions in the hands of the inventors rather than the
institution. Another argues that the Act should be altered to
include a mechanism that automatically transfers ownership of

See Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1410, 1414 (illustrating TTOs’
control over faculty members, limiting faculty interaction with industry).
237 See generally id.
238 See generally id.
239 See generally id.
240 See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting
Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 246–47 (2006); Kenney &
Patton, supra note 209, at 1410, 1419.
241 Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1411.
242 Bagley, supra note 240, at 246–47. Bagley also proposes an opt-in extended grace period for academic researchers.
236
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university inventions to the contractor-university, bypassing the
employee-inventor.243 Others firmly contend that the Act is not
broken and does not need to be fixed.244
A second group vigorously argues for a return to the “professor’s privilege,” where university inventions are always owned by
their inventors, not by the university.245 The American Association
of University Professors steadfastly maintains that faculty members
should control their own research, including their inventions,
and should either own those inventions or be closely involved in
decisions about their management, licensing and commercialization.246 The idea of faculty ownership of inventions does have a
certain intuitive appeal. It appears to be consistent with norms of
academic freedom and independence. Further, university professors are not typical employees like their counterparts in industry.247 Professors drive their own research agendas and, other


Toshiko Takenaka, Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership Under
the Bayh-Dole Act in Stanford v. Roche: Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle in
the German Employee Invention Act, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 281, 321–22 (2012).
244 Association of University Technology Managers, The Bayh-Dole Act: It’s
Working, https://www.autm.net/AUTMMain/media/Advocacy/Documents/Bayh
DoleTalkingPointsFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5VN-HHEY] (The Bayh-Dole
Act is as viable today as when it was passed, is good for the economy, and spurs
job creation); see also Ian Ayres & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, A Market Test for
Bayh-Dole Patents, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 301 (2017) (proposing that BayhDole should be mended, not ended, by creating a market test that asks whether
firms would be willing to commercialize an invention in exchange for a nonexclusive license for a nominal fee, prior to seeking an exclusive licensee).
245 See, e.g., Seminar Paper, Hans K. Hvide & Benjamin F. Jones, University Innovation and the Professor’s Privilege 1, 3 (June 2017), https://www.kel
logg.northwestern.edu/faculty/jones-ben/htm/University%20Innovation%20and
%20the%20Professors%20Privilege.pdf [https://perma.cc/87PF-N2SE] (demonstrating that when Norway abolished the professor’s privilege and moved to
the U.S. model, where the university owns faculty inventions, a 50 percent
decline in both patenting rates and entrepreneurship was experienced).
246 Report, Gary R. Nelson et al., Defending the Freedom to Innovate: Faculty Intellectual Property Rights After Stanford v. Roche, AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS 10, 17 (June 2014), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/files/aaup
Bulletin_IntellectualPropJune5.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2WS-CEL8].
247 Chew, supra note 19, at 266 (“Dubilier makes clear that typical university
faculty members would not be considered employees that are ‘hired to invent’
merely because research is part or all of their job responsibilities.”); see also
Sunil R. Kulkarni, All Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should Have
Complete Control Over the Intellectual Property Rights in Their Creations, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 221, 232 (1995).
243
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than being hired to teach specific classes, the direction of their
research is generally not dictated by the university.248 Such considerations argue in favor of allowing faculty members and other
university employees to retain ownership and control over their
inventions, which they undoubtedly know and understand better
than the university.249
However, dismantling the entire technology transfer system
and leaving university inventors on their own would be hugely
problematic in its own right and would be extremely disruptive.
Also, many faculty members, graduate students, and other employees may not want to be responsible for patenting and commercializing or licensing their inventions, or they may not be able to
afford to do so.
B.An Alternative Proposal
Instead, I propose a hybrid system where university inventors have the option to retain ownership of their inventions,
if they are interested in commercializing those inventions
through a startup company in which they have an ownership
interest or by licensing directly to a third party. The option to
retain ownership and control over their inventions would allow
university personnel to leverage and enhance their relationships
with industry.250 Faculty members would be directly involved in

Carter-Johnson, supra note 219, at 478–79, 481 (academic researchers and
faculty members are not acting as agents of the university; academic laboratories
operate as autonomous units within the university, and faculty members have the
right to decide how to shape their research); Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at
1413 (many economists and policy makers state falsely that university inventors
are employees in the same way that corporate researchers are employees).
249 James D. Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership of Federally Sponsored Research Patents, 49 IDEA 469, 498–500 (2009)
(assigning ownership of patents to university inventors makes sense, since
they are likely to be able to put those patents to their best use); cf. Peter van
Dongen et al., The Relationships Between University IP Regimes, Scientists’ Motivations and Their Engagement with Research Commercialization in Europe, 8
EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13 (2017) (concluding that a greater percentage of faculty
members are involved in entrepreneurship and commercialization of research
at universities that do take ownership of IP and have obligatory technology
transfer services).
250 See Dirk Czarnitski et al., Individual versus Institutional Ownership of
University-Discovered Inventions (USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2017-07,
248
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negotiating agreements for industrially sponsored research, which
would likely result in increased collaboration with industry partners
and enhanced opportunities for student mentorships, internships, and employment after graduation.251 University inventors
who want to create a startup would be able to assign inventions
directly to that company without the university acting as an
intermediary that imposes a tax (in the nature of licensing fees)
on that transaction.252
Those inventors who do not wish to own and manage their
inventions and other IP could assign their rights to a university
patent foundation that bears responsibility for managing the
technology. The patent foundation would be a non-profit organization that is legally separate from the university, not a technology transfer office that operates as an administrative division
of the university itself.253 The patent foundation would accept
assignment of inventions from faculty and other members of the
university community, seek patent protection, and then license
those patents out to third parties. Any resulting royalties would
be divided according to a standard formula (e.g., 50/50) between the
inventor and the foundation. To the extent the foundation receives
funds beyond those needed to support its operating costs, those
amounts would be reinvested in research at the university. As

2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2995672 [https://
perma.cc/NZ6J-7TBX].
251 See Henry C. Foley, A New Approach to Intellectual Property Management
and Industrially Funded Research at Penn State, RESEARCH-TECH. MGMT 12,
16 (Sept.–Oct. 2012). A few years ago, Penn State decided to reverse its position
that the university owned all IP resulting from industry-funded research. After
reviewing licensing revenues and lost opportunities (failed negotiations with
potential research partners), Penn State concluded that it would enjoy more
opportunities to conduct industry-sponsored research, as well as deeper relationships between faculty and students and their industry counterparts, and
could confer a greater economic benefit on society, by allowing industry sponsors to own intellectual property created in the course of such research. Id.
252 This model may also be attractive to smaller colleges that do not have an
organized technology transfer mechanism, since it would provide clarity for inventors and would relieve the school of any “obligation” to manage university IP.
253 One added benefit would be that universities would no longer be placed
in a position of having to enforce their own patents, causing them to incur huge
legal fees and to be characterized as nonpracticing entities or “trolls.” See Mark
A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 612, 618 (2008).
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one scholar commented about the WARF, “[w]ith this structure,
business matters would not concern or distract the university
from its educational mandate; yet academe could reap the rewards
from a well-managed patent whose royalties would pay for other
scientific work.”254
The university might elect to impose certain safeguards on
the new system, however. For example, the university may determine that it is still necessary and desirable to require inventors
to disclose their inventions to the university, so that it can document and track faculty productivity.255 If the university inventor does not take steps to commercialize the technology himself
through a company in which he owns an interest or to license it
to a third party within a reasonable time (to be defined by the
university based on the circumstances of the particular case or
its own general standards), then the university could intervene
and request that the patent foundation take appropriate steps to
patent and license the technology.256 These pseudo “march-in”
rights would allow the university to ensure that the public benefits
from university research and inventions, but it could also prevent
valuable technologies from inadvertently entering the public domain where patenting appears to be a preferred option.257 Alternatively, in some circumstances, the inventors might affirmatively
decide to place the invention in the public domain, and they could
then notify the university of their intention to do so.258
With invention ownership and technology transfer moved
out of the hands of the university, it would then be able to assume a
more natural role in entrepreneurship efforts: the role of educator.
The university would be able to reallocate funds previously used to
support the technology transfer mission and instead use them to
educate and assist university inventors.259 Specifically, the university could provide instructional programming on intellectual

MOWERY ET AL., supra note 70, at 39 (citing R.D. APPLE, VITAMANIA:
VITAMINS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1996)).
255 Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1413 (illustrating universities’ requirement that faculty members disclose their innovations despite their
adverse incentives).
256 See Vertinsky, supra note 233, at 2016–17.
257 See generally id.
258 Kenney & Patton, supra note 209, at 1414.
259 Id. at 1419 (describing how universities have become so focused on raising
revenue that they have put the goal of knowledge dissemination aside).
254
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property rights and patenting, licensing, and creating and running a business entity. It might also be able to draw on internal
programs at its business school to help entrepreneurial inventors
with developing a business plan, and it can fund law school clinics
and other programs to provide early assistance on intellectual
property and business law issues.
The university might also be in a position to provide financial and research assistance to its startup companies.260
Some universities may wish to make direct investments in their
startups in return for equity positions in the companies, or they
might be in a position to introduce inventors to angel investors and
venture capital firms.261 Others may form university-startup
partnerships that would help to further develop early stage
technologies so that they can be commercialized more effectively,
or they might create proof of concept centers (POCs) so that faculty inventors can demonstrate proof of concept for commercial
applications of their inventions without relying on federally
funded SBIRs and STTRs.262 These efforts could potentially provide valuable learning experiences for students on issues like
product development, which would be beneficial when they graduate and go to work in the industry.
In addition, universities could establish business incubators
to house startups and provide them with access to office and laboratory space and administrative services.263 The incubators could
attempt to negotiate bulk rates with accounting firms and law
firms, making business and legal services (including patenting)
more affordable for university inventors and startups.264 They
might also be able to provide assistance with assembling management teams or make introductions to prospective technical employees.265 A number of universities already engage in many of
these activities, and they generally do them well.266

Nag, supra note 225.
Id.
262 Id. (“[U]niversities [are] ... now taking active leadership in creating proof of
concept funds and other funds where they are either the lead limited partner or
catalyzing the raising of funds with the sole motivation of starting companies.”).
263 Id.
264 See id.
265 Id.
266 Id. (discussing how New York University, University of California, and
University of Chicago have designated $20 million, $250 million, and $25 million,
respectively, for venture funds).
260
261
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While this suite of services would not be inexpensive, they
could be funded in part by partnerships with federal, state and
local governments and economic development authorities. University entrepreneurs and incubator companies should also be
expected to bear some portion of the cost through rental fees for
incubator space or direct payment for services such as business
development, legal fees, and special educational programming.
For instance, the university might offer a course for entrepreneurs
on starting and managing a high-tech startup company, for which
it would charge tuition.
By allowing university inventors the option to retain ownership of their inventions and removing the technology transfer
burden from the university, institutions of higher education would
be able to focus on what they do best: providing education, research
services, and support for entrepreneurial endeavors. Universities
can then take a leading role in building a vibrant entrepreneurial
ecosystem that builds trust between members of the university
community, supports the efforts of industry partners, and contributes in a meaningful way to local and national economic development and growth.267
CONCLUSION
University positions on ownership of inventions made by
faculty, staff, and students evolved gradually over the last 100
years, and today most universities claim that they own the inventive output of members of the university community.268 Often, their positions do not accurately reflect the state of the law,
and members of the university may not even be aware that they
cannot claim personal ownership of their patents and other inventions.269 In the short term, universities must revise their IP

Cummings, supra note 199, at 1039 (2014) (“The business model for this
new century is an entrepreneurial university with a mission of economic development, in addition to research and teaching, and an interdisciplinary organizational structure that facilitates knowledge-based innovation.”). Cummings
suggests that we give more ownership of inventions to colleges and their
faculties, develop entrepreneurial programs that are aligned with business
schools, and facilitate an ongoing collaboration with industry.
268 See, e.g., Statement of Policy in Regard to Intellectual Property § 1(C),
supra note 16.
269 Chew, supra note 19, at 289.
267
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policies and practices to clarify that assignment of inventions is
required as a term and condition of employment, and also to exempt
tuition-paying students from the grasp of the policy. Going forward,
universities may want to consider returning to their traditional role
as educators and facilitators, while allowing inventors the option
of owning their inventions or assigning them to a third-party
patent foundation. Even if universities ultimately elect not to
adopt the long-term proposal outlined herein, a renewed discussion
of the questions and possible alternatives would be an important
advancement in modernizing the standard model for ownership
of university inventions.

